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THE FSIA AND CYBERSPACE:
COULD HACT BE THE ANSWER?
Ritika Malkani*

What if another country could launch an attack against you while you were in
the United States, and you could do nothing about it in an American court of
law?
Imagine sitting in your living room opening an email from a friend, when
suddenly, without your knowledge, malware embedded in the email installed a
program that allowed the government of another country to spy on everything
you do for years. A program that can extract private passwords from your
computer and record every call and email you send. Then, you try to get justice
for this tortious conduct in court, but because the command-and-control server
where the malware originated is located abroad, the American justice system
cannot help you.
Unfortunately, for one plaintiff who goes by the pseudonym Kidane, this was
not merely a hypothetical, but his reality.1 To add fuel to the fire, defense counsel
in Kidane’s case did not deny that he had been wiretapped, and claimed that the
Defendant could not even be sued for more extreme conduct like “mailing a
letter bomb into the United States to assassinate an opponent,” or hacking a selfdriving car, causing a horrific crash, simply because this conduct could be done
from abroad.2
Despite the rapid advancement of internet related technologies, and the
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proliferation of cybercrimes, a foreign state’s tortious actions using these tools
from afar do not currently result in legal consequences, as these cases are barred
from being brought in American courts by jurisdictional considerations set out
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA” or the “Act”).3
Existing law is insufficient in addressing several issues regarding cyberspace.
The FSIA is an example of such existing law.4 In summary, the Act immunizes
foreign states from the jurisdiction of American courts, provided certain
exceptions to immunity do not apply.5 One such exception is the noncommercial tort exception,6 which several courts have interpreted as referring to
torts occurring ‘wholly’ within the United States.7 This gives rise to a gap in the
legal framework regarding cybercrime when a portion of the crime occurs
abroad (i.e., a foreign state hacks into the electronic devices of U.S. citizens from
abroad), since the victim in the United States is left with no avenue of redress in
a U.S. court.8 The Homeland and Cyber Threat Act (“HACT”) purports to close
this gap by amending Title 28 of the U.S. Code, “to allow claims against foreign
states for unlawful computer intrusion and other purposes.”9 Is this sufficient to
address the existing problem? Could a wholly new cyber convention be
necessary?
Section II of this article will examine the existing framework: immunity from
jurisdiction under international law and the FSIA. Section III will discuss the
existing problems, including attribution of conduct and defenses to attribution
of conduct, and Section IV considers potential solutions, namely: the HACT,
expansion of the terrorism exception of the FSIA, and overruling the entire tort
doctrine as applied to the FSIA’s non-commercial tort exception.
I.

THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK

A. Immunity From Jurisdiction Under International Law
Before the FSIA was enacted, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2016).
Id.
5
Id.
6
§ 1605(a)(5).
7
Doe v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., 189 F. Supp. 3d 6, 19 (D.D.C. 2016).
8
John B. Bellinger, III et al., Can You Be Sued Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act?: A Primer for Foreign Governments and Their Agencies, ARNOLD&PORTER
(Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2021/01/canyou-be-sued-under-fsia.
9
H.R. 4189, 116th Cong. (2019).
3
4

2021]

The FSIA and Cyberspace

129

developed through the common law.10 States generally followed one of two
theories of jurisdictional immunity of foreign states: (1) the absolute (classical)
theory, whereby a sovereign could not, unless it consented, be made a
respondent in a court of another sovereign, or (2) the restrictive theory, where
the immunity of a sovereign was recognized with regard to its public acts, but
not its private acts.11
The United States initially followed the absolute theory of immunity,
according to foreign states immunity from suit unless the executive branch
objected. 12 In 1812, in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, Chief Justice
Marshall of the Supreme Court wrote:
Jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself… this full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike
the attribute of every sovereign would not seem to contemplate
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects.13
A definitive break in U.S. practice regarding immunity only came about in
1952, promulgated by a letter from the Department of State’s14 acting legal
advisor, Jack B. Tate, to the Acting U.S. Attorney General Philip B. Perlman.15
This would later become known as “the Tate letter.”16 The Tate letter purported
to adopt the restrictive approach, abandoning the theory of absolute immunity,
and allowing plaintiffs to sue foreign governments for their public (i.e.,
commercial) acts for the first time. In support of this decision, and upon
examination of other state’s practices, Tate wrote “little support has been
found… for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity” and “for these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy to
follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of
requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.”17
This had little effect at first in federal court, as the executive branch continued

10 James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, Sovereign Immunity: A Venerable Concept in
Transition?, 27 INT’L LITIG. Q. at 1 (May 3, 2011), as reproduced by PAUL HASTINGS,
https://webstorage.paulhastings.com/Documents/PDFs/1902.pdf.
11 See generally LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2019) (describing both theories of jurisdictional immunity
of foreign states and their backgrounds).
12 Berger & Sun, supra note 10.
13 Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812).
14 The Department of State is “the agency responsible for interpreting immunities to be
accorded under international law.” DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 807.
15 Berger & Sun, supra note 10. See DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 807
(explaining that the Department of State is “the agency responsible for interpreting
immunities to be accorded under international law”).
16 Berger & Sun, supra note 10.
17 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 809–10.
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to decide questions of sovereign immunity, and courts continued to abide by
their suggestions of immunity.18 However, this did “throw immunity
determinations into some disarray, as foreign nations often placed
diplomatic pressure on the State Department, and political considerations
sometimes led the Department to file suggestions of immunity in cases where
immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory.”19
After the Tate Letter, determinations of immunity started to involve two
separate branches of government, the judicial branch and the executive branch,
instead of just the executive branch, which made the entire process more difficult
and less clear. Despite this dilution of power, the executive branch was
frequently called upon to appear in court to give its opinion on determinations
of grants of immunity, a burden which added to the pressure to “enact a statutory
scheme that would provide legally defined standards for courts to apply rather
than ad hoc interventions by the executive.”20
The FSIA was born out of these challenges.
B. The United States’ Adoption of the FSIA
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976, which
codified the restrictive theory of immunity set out in the Tate letter. 21 It is a
statute that prohibits U.S. courts from having jurisdiction over cases against
foreign states, unless one of several enumerated exceptions apply.22 Essentially,
the Act presumes immunity, and an exception to it could rebut the presumption.
It is important to note that the FSIA’s application is required in every cause of
action against a foreign sovereign, because subject-matter jurisdiction depends
on it.23
1.

Exclusivity

One of the first issues that U.S. courts grappled with after the FSIA was
passed was whether the Act provided the exclusive basis for suing foreign states
in U.S. courts.24 The United States Supreme Court ruled on this issue in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., holding in favor of FSIA’s

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004).
Id.
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 812.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2016).
See id.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434–35 (1989).
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 812.
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exclusivity.25 In the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote “we think that the
text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress’ intention that the FSIA be
the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
courts.”26
This has been reaffirmed many times since then, and is no longer a
contentious issue.27 One such reaffirmation is the Second Circuit’s decision in
Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, stating that if applied, the FSIA “provides
the exclusive basis for subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions against
foreign state defendants, and therefore for a court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a defendant the action must fall within one of the FSIA’s
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.”28
2.

Retroactivity

Another issue facing U.S. courts after the enactment of the FSIA was whether
the Act applied retroactively to a foreign state’s actions taken prior to the
enactment. Three cases decided in the 1980s29 established that prior to the Tate
letter, the FSIA could not be retroactively applied.30 However, after those
decisions were handed down, there was still debate about whether the FSIA
applied retroactively to the time period between the Tate letter and the enactment
of the FSIA.
Before the FSIA was enacted, jurisdiction over foreign states was treated as
diversity jurisdiction under the U.S. Code.31 Congress eliminated that portion
of the Code upon enactment of the FSIA, since the FSIA became the only basis
for jurisdiction over foreign states.32 This raised a problem, because “by
removing foreign sovereign defendants from the diversity jurisdiction statute, a
prospective FSIA would have the effect of preventing suits prior to 1976 from
being heard in U.S. courts . . . [creating] ‘a blank period’ from 1952-1976 when

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 443.
Id. at 434.
27 Id. at 434, 443 (1989); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir.
2010); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1963).
28 Weinstein, 609 F.3d at 47.
29 Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, 665 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff’d, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2874 (1988); Jackson v. China,
596 F. Supp. 386, aff’d, 74 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987);
Slade v. Mex., 617 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d, 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 1032, reh’g denied, 480 U.S. 912 (1987).
30 Michael E. Jansen, FSIA Retroactivity Subsequent to the Issuance of the Tate Letter:
A Proposed Solution to the Confusion, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 333, 335 (1989).
31 Adam K. A. Mortara, The Case Against Retroactive Application of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 261 (2001).
32 Id. at 261–62.
25
26
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the U.S. had adopted, but not codified, the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.”33
The Supreme Court discussed this issue in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
noting strong historical opposition toward and presumption against retroactive
statutory application. 34 Commentary accompanying the Landgraf decision
opines that:
The presumption against statutory retroactivity is founded upon
elementary considerations of fairness dictating that individuals
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
their conduct accordingly. It is deeply rooted in this Court’s
jurisprudence and finds expression in several constitutional
provisions, including, in the criminal context, the Ex Post
Facto Clause. In the civil context, prospectivity remains the
appropriate default rule unless Congress has made clear its intent to
disrupt settled expectations.35
Additionally, the Landgraf Court referenced the Constitution’s prohibition on
bills of attainder, the due process clause, and the Fifth Amendment as supporting
this presumption, and to demonstrate concern surrounding retroactive statutes.36
After Landgraf was decided, the Supreme Court in Austria v. Altmann
struggled with whether or not the FSIA applied to pre-enactment conduct, since
“Landgraf’s default rule does not definitively resolve this case.”37 The Court
considered that the FSIA was not just a jurisdictional statute, but that it codified
substantive standards of foreign sovereign immunity.38 The Court also looked
to the purpose of the presumption against retroactivity—”the aim of the
presumption is to avoid unnecessary post hoc changes to legal rules on which
parties relied in shaping their primary conduct”, and the purpose of the FSIA,
which has “never been to permit foreign states and their instrumentalities to
shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit in
United States courts. Rather, such immunity “reflects current political realities
and relationships . . .” acting to prevent the inconvenience of litigating suits
abroad, as a matter of comity.39
The Altmann Court ultimately determined that the FSIA indeed applied to
petitioner’s 1948 actions, citing “clear” evidence of Congress’ intent for the Act
to apply to such actions, pointing to the preamble of the Act, which the Court
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 262.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 279 (1994).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 266.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 696.
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interpreted as “Congress intended courts to resolve all such claims ‘in
conformity with the principles set forth’ in the Act, regardless of when the
underlying conduct occurred.”40
Some scholars take the view that the FSIA should not be applied retroactively,
since there is no express provision regarding retroactivity within it.41 Others
believe retroactivity is inappropriate as applied to substantive statutes (versus
purely jurisdictional statutes, which the FSIA is not), and “that a pre-1952
application of FSIA would prejudice antecedent rights.”42 This, however, does
not seem to be the view of the U.S. Supreme Court.
In May of 2020, the Supreme Court in Opati v. Republic of Sudan ruled for
plaintiffs who sought compensation from Sudan for its participation in terrorist
attacks bombing U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. 43 These acts
occurred prior to the amendment of the FSIA’s terrorism exception allowing
punitive damages, however, the Court found Altmann compelling in deciding
for the plaintiffs and allowed retroactive application of the statute; “because
foreign
sovereign
immunity
is
a
gesture of
grace
and
comity, Altmann reasoned, it is also something that may be withdrawn
retroactively without the same risk to due process and equal protection
principles that other forms of backward-looking legislation can pose.”44 The
Court determined that the new provisions both explicitly authorized punitive
damages, and allowed the provision to be used to remedy past acts of terrorism.45
While the Opati and Altmann decisions are quite narrow, they are a step
toward Congress’ potential ability to pass future legislation that applies
retroactively, therefore imposing liability on previously immune sovereigns.
Judicial Interpretation: What Is A ‘Foreign State’?

3.

In order for the FSIA to apply, a state must be considered a ‘foreign state’.
After the FSIA was enacted, courts struggled with what this meant. The FSIA
section 1603(a) defines the term “foreign state” to include “a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state.”46

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 697–98.
Mortara, supra note 31, at 260.
Id. at 254, 261.
Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1604 (2020).
Id. at 1608. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 689.
Opati, 140 S. Ct. at 1609.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2016).
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Agency or Instrumentality

FSIA Section 1603(b) provides that an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state” is one:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined
in section 1332 (c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of
any third country.47
According to the FSIA’s legislative history, generally, an entity that meets the
definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state could assume a variety
of forms, organizations, such as a shipping line or an airline, a steel company, a
central bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency, or a
department or ministry which acts and is su[e]able in its own name.”48
There is some additional guidance regarding the definition of “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” within case law. For example, in considering
whether foreign officials acting in an official capacity are considered a “foreign
state” within the FSIA, the United States Supreme Court in Samantar v. Yousef
stated that:
Petitioner argues that either ‘foreign state,’ . . . or ‘agency or
instrumentality,’ . . . could be read to include a foreign official.
Although we agree that petitioner’s interpretation is literally
possible, our analysis of the entire statutory text persuades us that
petitioner’s reading is not the meaning that Congress enacted. 49
The Court reasoned that the terms used within the FSIA, specifically “organ,”
and “separate legal person” do not typically apply to natural persons or
individuals.50 The Court also reasoned that Congress could have, if it had
wanted to, explicitly stated that the FSIA applies to foreign officials because
“elsewhere in the FSIA Congress expressly mentioned officials when it wished
to count their acts as equivalent to those of the foreign state, which suggests that
officials are not included within the unadorned term ‘foreign state.’”51
Other examples include Singh v. Caribbean Airlines, Ltd., a case in which the
§ 1603(b).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov
/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Service-ofProcess/Foreign-Sovereign-Immunities-Act.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
49 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 314–15 (2010).
50 Id. at 315.
51 Id. at 317.
47
48
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Eleventh Circuit found that an airline “qualifie[d] as an agency or
instrumentality of Trinidad and Tobago,”52 and Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,
where the Supreme Court upheld a lower court holding that “a subsidiary of an
instrumentality is not itself entitled to instrumentality status” with regard to the
FSIA. 53
C. FSIA Exceptions
If a claim falls outside of the listed exceptions to the FSIA, a U.S. court lacks
both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, rendering the defendant
immune.54 When one of the exceptions applies, however, “the foreign state shall
be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances.”55 The listed exceptions include: waiver,56 commercial
activities,57 “property taken in violation of international law,”58 “succession or
gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States,”59 noncommercial torts,60 maritime liens,61 and terrorism.62 Specifically with regard
to cybercrime, relevant exceptions include the non-commercial tort exception,
and the terrorism exception.63
1.

FSIA: Non-Commercial Tort Exception

The non-commercial tort exception of the FSIA is laid out in section 1605,
which states in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case—
(5) …money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
Singh v. Caribbean Airlines Ltd., 798 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2015).
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003).
54 David P. Stewart, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for Judges, FED.
JUD. CENTER (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/FSIAGuide2013.pdf.
55 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2016).
56 § 1605(a)(1).
57 § 1605(a)(2).
58 § 1605(a)(3).
59 § 1605(a)(4).
60 § 1605(a)(5).
61 § 1605(b).
62 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)–(2) (2008).
63 John J. Martin, Hacks Dangerous to Human Life: Using Jasta to Overcome Foreign
Sovereign Immunity in State-Sponsored Cyberattack Cases, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 122–
23, 126 (2021).
52
53
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acting within the scope of his office or employment; except this
paragraph shall not apply to— (A) any claim based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (B) any
claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights.64
This provision allows American plaintiffs to sue and claim damages against
foreign states in U.S. courts with regard to the foreign state’s tortious actions
against them.65 The Supreme Court in Amerada Hess, explained that “Congress’
primary purpose in enacting [section] 1605(a)(5) was to eliminate a foreign
state’s immunity for traffic accidents and other torts committed in the
United States, for which liability is imposed under domestic tort law.” 66
However, despite Congress’ hope that enacting the FSIA would solve issues
raised by common law, subsequent judicial interpretation of the Act has brought
up new issues of its own.67
i. Judicial Interpretation: The Entire Tort Doctrine
An example of an issue raised by judicial interpretation of the FSIA appears
in the context of the non-commercial tort exception, which the Supreme Court
and “every federal court of appeals to have considered the question” considers
to apply to only torts occurring entirely within the United States. 68 This has
come to be known as ‘the entire tort doctrine.’
In addressing what is meant by “entirely within the United States,” the D.C.
Circuit Court in Schermerhorn v. State of Israel “held recently that ‘the United
States’ is ‘limited to the geographic territories and waters of the United States’
and does not include US-flagged ships on the high seas.”69 Additionally, the
Supreme Court in Amerada Hess denied jurisdiction over a dispute occurring
5,000 miles off U.S. shores under the FSIA non-commercial tort exception,
construing the phrase “continental and insular” in the statute “to restrict the
definition of United States to the continental United States and those islands that
are part of the United States or its possessions; any other reading would render

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A)–(B) (2016).
Bellinger, III et al., supra note 8.
66 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439–40 (1989).
67 Judi L. Abbott, The Noncommercial Torts Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 134, 141 (1985).
68 Bellinger, III et al., supra note 8.
69 Bellinger, III et al., supra note 8; Schermerhorn v. State of Israel, 876 F.3d 351, 355–
56 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
64
65
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this phrase nugatory.”70 The Amerada Hess Court went on to say that Congress
could have, if it had intended to, placed the high seas within the statute, and thus
applied the “the canon of construction which teaches that legislation of
Congress, unless contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”71
ii. Judicial Interpretation: Direct Effects
The concept of ‘direct effects’ opines that a tort occurring abroad could have
consequences that are felt within the United States. However, this concept does
not apply to the non-commercial tort exception because “[a]lthough the statutory
provision is susceptible of the interpretation that only the effect of the tortious
action need occur here, where Congress intended such a result elsewhere in the
FSIA it said so more explicitly.”72
The Court in Amerada Hess explains this point, articulating that the case
would not have come out differently even if the “petitioner’s tort had had effects
felt in the United States,” and notes that Congress intentionally used explicit
language in section 1605(a)(2) regarding “direct effects,” yet chose not to
include this phrase in section 1605(a)(5) (i.e. the non-commercial tort
exception), indicating that section 1605(a)(5) “covers only torts occurring within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”73
In a more recent case, Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the
D.C. District Court upheld the interpretation of “occurring in the United States”
to mean occurring wholly within the United States, invoking the “entire tort”
doctrine relied on by several other courts.74 The Court reiterated that “the fact
that the plaintiff incurred an injury in the United States, or that the ‘alleged tort
may have had effects in the United States,’ is insufficient to waive sovereign
immunity.”75
The Doe case is a recent interpretation of the “entire tort” doctrine, and what
this article’s initial hypothetical is based on. The facts are as follows: Plaintiff
“Kidane,” a Maryland resident who was born in Ethiopia, and who sought
asylum in the United States, fell victim to a computer program called FinSpy
when he opened an email on his computer which had allegedly been sent from

70
71
72

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 440.
Id. (quoting Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1524 (D.C. Cir.

1984).
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 441; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2016).
Doe v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., 189 F. Supp. 3d 6, 19 (D.D.C. 2016).
75 Id. (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441
(1989)).
73
74
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Ethiopia to a third party and forwarded to Kidane.76 The email had an
attachment that, once opened, caused a “clandestine client program to be
surreptitiously downloaded onto his computer.”77 Kidane alleged that FinSpy
intercepted and recorded some of his emails, web searches, and Skype calls.78
He filed a two-claim complaint, one pursuant to the Wiretap Act, and the other
under Maryland tort law. 79 Ethiopia moved to dismiss.80 The Court concluded
that the Wiretap Act did not create a cause of action against a foreign state for
interceptions of certain communication and granted Ethiopia’s motion to dismiss
count one.81
Then the Doe Court considered the FSIA, and whether it barred Kidane from
asserting the tort claim against Ethiopia.82 In its discussion, the Court stated
that:
Although it is well-settled that the non-commercial tort exception
“covers only torts occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States,” it is unclear how that rule applies to the instant case,
in which the alleged intrusion involves the infiltration of Kidane’s
computer located at his home in Maryland, yet no agent or employee
of Ethiopia is alleged to have ever set foot in the United States in
connection with that tort.83
It then looked to committee reports and proponents of the legislation to aid them
in concluding the legislative intent of Congress was to limit liability to torts
carried out in the United States.84 The fact that Congress’ primary purpose in
enacting the FSIA was to create liability for foreign states regarding torts like
traffic accidents committed in the United States also supported their
determination.85
The Court acknowledged that had Ethiopia sent a human to Kidane’s house
to install the same device, Kidane would have an avenue of remedy under
FSIA, 86 however, the Court stated “technology has simply rendered the human
agent obsolete.”87 Additionally, the Court conceded that Ethiopia’s argument
that the entire tort did not occur within the U.S. since the tortfeasors were located
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id.at 11.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 16–25.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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overseas was incomplete because it “fails to grapple with the modern world in
which the Internet breaks down traditional conceptions of physical presence.”88
Despite this, the Doe Court concluded that Ethiopia’s view was more
compelling upon the consideration of three factors, including: (1) that where the
tort occurred was not separate from the physical location of the tortfeasors, (2)
the D.C. Circuit had previously cautioned against broadly applying the noncommercial tort exception for all torts that have some relationship to the U.S.,
and (3) the legislative history of the Act provided support for the view that a tort
must be wholly occurring in the U.S.89 Additionally, the Court noted that the
FSIA can be amended by the legislature, if enough people disagree with their
interpretation.90 The Court ultimately held that Kidane’s claim was barred, due
to the entire tort doctrine, therefore rendering Ethiopia immune from jurisdiction
in U.S. federal court under the FSIA. 91
The “entire tort” test has been widely accepted and even incorporated into the
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. 92 However,
criticism has been levied that this interpretation gives rise to “intuitive practical
objections . . . [f]or one, it seems to reward gamesmanship on the part of foreign
governments . . . [and] it isn’t the easiest concept to apply with confidence. And
however difficult locating a tort might be in an ordinary case, a tort involving
the Internet immensely complicates the inquiry.”93
iii. FSIA: Terrorism exception
The FSIA has been amended several times—perhaps most notably in 1996,
“to deny immunity to foreign states that have been formally designated by the
U.S. government as state sponsors of terrorism . . . “94 It was amended again in
2008, recodifying the state sponsored terrorism exception and creating a new
code section, section 1605A.95
The terrorism exception (section 1605A) states in pertinent part:
(a)IN GENERAL.—
(1)NO IMMUNITY.—

Id.
Id. at 21, 23, 24.
90 Id. at 25–25, aff’d, 851 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
91 Id.
92 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 457, reporters’ notes n.1
(AM. LAW INST. 2018).
93 Grayson Clary, Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Where Do Hacking
Torts Happen? LAWFARE (May 1, 2018) https://www.lawfareblog.com/under-foreignsovereign-immunities-act-where-do-hacking-torts-happen.
94 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 817.
95 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (2008); see also DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 817.
88
89
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A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered
by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act
of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or
the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such
act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.96
In comparing the 2008 terrorism exception and the non-commercial tort
exception, notable differences arise, including that the non-commercial tort
exception only applies to torts occurring fully within the United States, whereas
the terrorism exception in section 1605A applies to torts committed abroad, and
that the non-commercial tort exception “presents a more limited jurisdictional
framework than the one reflected in the state-sponsors-of-terrorism exception,”
because even torts committed outside the U.S. that have a direct effect within
the U.S. are insufficient to invoke the exception.97
Additionally, section 1605A provides “that such plaintiffs could seek punitive
damages,” a departure from the FSIA’s general bar of punitive damages in suits
falling under one of the exceptions to the Act.98 In Opati, the Supreme Court
“declared without any ambiguity that . . . ‘Congress was as clear as it could have
been when it authorized plaintiffs to seek and win punitive damages for past
conduct. . . .’”99 This decision, however, does not prevent challenges to punitive
damages sought retroactively under the FSIA.100
(i) JASTA
In 2016, the legislature overrode President Barack Obama’s veto and passed
the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”).101 This Act eliminated the
“state sponsor of terrorism” designation requirement under the existing FSIA
provision, abrogated the entire tort doctrine, and allowed for its retroactive

§ 1605A (2008).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 457.
98 Haley S. Anderson, The Significant of the Supreme Court’s Opati Decision for States
and Companies Sued for Terrorism in U.S. Courts, JUST SEC. (May 19, 2020), https://www.
justsecurity.org/70260/the-significance-of-the-supreme-courts-opati-decision-for-states-andcompanies-sued-for-terrorism-in-u-s-courts/. See § 1605A(c).
99 Anderson, supra note 98.
100 Id.
101 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), Pub. L. No. 114-222, sec. 3, §
1605B(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B).
96
97
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application.102
The purpose of JASTA was “to provide civil litigants with the broadest
possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, to seek relief
against persons, entities, and foreign countries…that have provided material
support, directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or persons that engage in
terrorist activities against the United States.”103
The Act provides in pertinent part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any case in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for physical injury to person or property
or death occurring in the United States and caused by—
(1) an act of international terrorism in the United States; and
(2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official,
employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope
of his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless where the
tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred.104
With regard to the FSIA, JASTA “further narrows sovereign immunity of
foreign countries in giving the U.S. jurisdiction to respond in court to any act of
international terrorism, including monetary support for terrorist groups.”105
Prior to JASTA’s enactment, the FSIA’s terrorism exception made it such that
you could not sue a foreign state for international terrorism in U.S. courts unless
the government first designated that state as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”106
JASTA eliminated this limitation, and “as a result, any foreign state may now
be sued in US courts for acts of international terrorism that cause injury in the
United States.”107
By expanding the FSIA’s non-commercial tort exception, JASTA abrogated
the entire tort doctrine, providing for “jurisdiction ‘regardless of where the
tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred’ . . . a state can now be sued in
U.S. courts for alleged tortious conduct committed anywhere in the world, as
long as there is a nexus to an act of terrorism occurring within the United

102 Matthew H. Kirtland & Andrew James Lom, Layperson’s Guide- Justice Against
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Dec. 2016), https://www.nortonros
efulbright.com/en-zw/knowledge/publications/d1a384e4/laypersons-guide—-justiceagainst-sponsors-of-terrorism-act.
103 Pub. L. No. 114-222, sec. 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853.
104 Pub. L. No. 114-222, sec. 3, § 1605B(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853.
105 Lindsay Meyerson, Should We Prioritize Sovereign States or American Victims?
JASTA & FSIA, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2016), https://blogs.cuit.
columbia.edu/culr/2016/10/31/should-we-prioritize-sovereign-states-or-american-victimsjasta-fsia/.
106 Kirtland & Lom, supra note 102.
107 Id.
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States.”108 Additionally, JASTA can be applied retroactively to “any civil
lawsuit pending on, or commenced on or after, the date it was enacted
(September 28, 2016) and arising out of an injury to a person, property, or
business occurring on or after September 11, 2001.”109 This allowed for
legislative abrogation of “judicial decisions that had dismissed such cases
brought by victims of the September 11, 2011 attacks on the United States.”110
II. THE EXISTING PROBLEMS
A. The Rise of Cyber Crime
1.

Background

Cybercrime is “defined as a crime where a computer is the object of the crime
or us used as a tool to commit an offense.”111 It is generally divided into two
types: “crimes that target networks or devices [and] crimes using devices to
participate in criminal activities.”112 There are also three general categories of
cybercrime, organized by who or what the crime affects or who or what the
criminal is: individual, property, or government.113
Cybercrime was born in the 1970s, when a group of technologically savvy
individuals (“phreakers”) targeted computerized phone systems. 114 Almost two
decades later, in 1986, Congress enacted the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”) as a direct legislative response to hacking. 115 The CFAA’s
purpose was to criminalize unauthorized access to protected computers, and has
been amended several times to address new advances in cybercrime. 116 Its scope
has also broadened over time—amendments in 1994 “added civil remedies and
expanded the coverage of the statute to include unauthorized transmissions, and
amendments in 1996 changed the phrase ‘federal interest computer’ to
108 James Berger & Charlene Sun, JASTA Amendments to FSIA Become Law, KING &
SPALDING (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/jasta-amendments-to-fsiabecome-law-81257/.
109 Kirtland & Lom, supra note 102.
110 Berger & Sun, supra note 108.
111 Types of Cybercrime, PANDA SEC. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.pandasecurity.com
/en/mediacenter/panda-security/types-of-cybercrime [hereinafter PANDA SEC.].
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Connor Madsen, The Evolution of Cybercrime, WEBROOT (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.webroot.com/blog/2019/04/23/the-evolution-of-cybercrime.
115 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), NACDL, https://www.nacdl.org/Landing
/ComputerFraudandAbuseAct# (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) [hereinafter NACDL].
116 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2020).
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‘protected computer,’ thereby significantly broadening the Act’s reach.”117
Along with these amendments came the question of extraterritorial application
of the statute — whether you could prosecute perpetrators abroad who commit
computer abuse affecting computers in the U.S.118
In United States v. Ivanov, where the defendant was physically in Russia but
accessed computers in the U.S., the District Court of Connecticut found that it
had subject matter jurisdiction “whether or not the statutes under which the
substantive offenses are charged are intended by Congress to apply
extraterritorially, because the intended and actual detrimental effects of the
substantive offenses Ivanov is charged with in the indictment occurred within
the United States.”119 In looking at the 1996 amendments to the CFAA and
comments to the statute, the Court stated “Congress has clearly manifested its
intent to apply § 1030 to computers used either in interstate or in foreign
commerce. The legislative history of the CFAA supports this reading of the plain
language of the statute.”120
In less than half a century, federal computer crime laws went from being
virtually non-existent to covering almost every aspect of computer activity in
society.121 Penalties for violating the CFAA are up to 10 years in prison, and
double that for a second offense.122 In 1989, Robert Morris became the first
person to be prosecuted under the CFAA.123 He released “the Morris worm”
into the world — a self-replicating program which overwhelmed computers and
servers, causing widespread damage.124
Since then, cybercrime has risen exponentially, and evolved extremely
rapidly.125 There are several new ways in which cybercriminals can wreak
havoc, including: phishing (tricking users into giving up sensitive information),
ransomware (malware that can gain access to a system and block users from
their own data), and cryptojacking (stealing cryptocurrency by embedding a type
of code into a website).126 Other common methods of attack include, distributed
denial of service attacks (which make an online service unavailable to users),
botnets (externally controlled networks from compromised computers), identity
117 William K. Kane & Melissa M. Mikhail, Extraterritorial Application of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, NAT’L L. REV. (July 3, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/extraterritorial-application-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act.
118 Id.
119 United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (D. Conn. 2001).
120 Id. at 374.
121 NACDL, supra note 115.
122 Id.
123 Madsen, supra note 114.
124 Id.
125 The Fascinating Decade in Cybercrime: 2010 to 2020, ARCTIC WOLF BLOG (Feb. 21,
2020), https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/decade-of-cybercrime.
126 Madsen, supra note 114.
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theft, cyberstalking, and exploit kits (tools criminals can buy online to gain
control of a user’s computer).127
In 2020, worldwide spending on cybersecurity was in the billions, and
security breaches have increased from 2018 by 11% (up 67% since 2014).128
Hackers attack approximately every 39 seconds, and the average cost of a data
breach or malware attack is in the millions.129 Even more troubling to note,
cybercrime increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.130
2.

COVID-19 and Cybercrime

Phishing websites increased by 350% during the first quarter of 2020, with
many attacks targeting hospitals and health care systems causing delays and
disruptions in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.131 Hackers and
terrorists are “exploiting the significant disruption and economic hardships
caused by COVID-19 to spread fear, hate, and division and radicalize and recruit
new followers.”132 An Interpol assessment on cybercrime and COVID-19 has
shown a shift towards larger targets such as governments, critical infrastructure,
and big corporations as opposed to individuals and small businesses. 133 With
people working from home, increasing online dependency, cybercriminals are
taking advantage of the increased vulnerabilities in computer systems. 134
Hackers are also taking advantage of human vulnerabilities — perpetuating
uncertainty and fear in people by spreading misinformation and fake news,
contributing to anxiety in communities.135
Before a COVID-19 vaccine was available, medical trials became a target for
foreign computer hackers in an attempt to steal the formula for their country in
order to disrupt the distribution.136 Microsoft reported that “seven prominent
PANDA SEC., supra note 111.
29 Must-know Cybersecurity Statistics for 2020, CYBER OBSERVER, https://www.
cyber-observer.com/cyber-news-29-statistics-for-2020-cyber-observer/ (last visited Sept. 30,
2021).
129 Id.
130 Edith M. Lederer, UN Reports Sharp Increase in Cybercrime During Pandemic, AP
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-counterterrorism-healthcrime-phishing-824b3e8cd5002fe238fb9cbd99115bca.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 INTERPOL Report Shows Alarming Rate of Cyberattacks During COVID-19,
INTERPOL (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-andEvents/News/2020/INTERPOL-report-shows-alarming-rate-of-cyberattacks-duringCOVID-19.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Gary Horcher, Microsoft: Foreign Cyber Hackers Are Targeting COVID-19 Vaccine
127
128
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but unnamed biotech companies testing vaccines were targeted in Canada,
France, India, South Korea, and the United States” by Strontium, a Russian
actor, and by Zinc and Cerium, North Korean actors. 137 As the law stands, these
foreign-state bad actors who deploy malware from abroad, despite attacking
American citizens, hospitals, and corporations, are immune from prosecution in
U.S. courts under the FSIA.138
The threat is here, immediate, and very real. In fact, in 2020, the U.S.
Department of Justice charged, and a grand jury indicted, two Chinese hackers
with attempting to steal coronavirus research.139 The grand jury’s indictment
against the two men alleged that “in many cases they worked on behalf of
China’s Ministry of State Security and other government agencies.”140
However, proving this is the difficult part.
B. Attribution of Conduct and State Responsibility
In order for an exception to the FSIA’s immunity to apply, a Plaintiff must
attribute the tortious conduct at issue to a foreign state. A state must take
responsibility for its actions. In international law, there are fundamental
principles of state responsibility: (1) if a state breaches an international
obligation, it incurs responsibility for it; (2) if the breach results in injury to
another state, the breaching state must pay the injured State reparations; and (3)
the injured state may, in certain circumstances, take actions of self-help and
countermeasures.141 These primary rules of state responsibility address the
sources of responsibility, and secondary rules on state responsibility address the
consequences of “failure[s] to fulfill obligations established by the primary
rules.”142
In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
discussed the distinction between the two types of rules, opining that while a
determination of whether a convention is in force is made per the law of treaties,
an “evaluation of the extent to which the suspension or denunciation of a
Companies, KIRO 7 (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/microsoft-foreigncyber-hackers-are-targeting-covid-19-vaccinecompanies/VVTSOVZ2NBDPLBW6FESIUN4UGA.
137 Id.
138 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
139 Sergei Klebnikov, DOJ Charges Chinese Hackers with Trying to Steal Coronavirus
Research As Part of Decade-Long Intrusion Campaign, FORBES (July 21, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/07/21/doj-charges-chinese-hackerswith-trying-to-steal-coronavirus-research-as-part-of-decade-long-intrusioncampaign/?sh=f5a876a35a10.
140 Id.
141 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 479.
142 Id. at 481.
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convention, seen as incompatible with the law of treaties, involves the
responsibility of the state which proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of
state responsibility.”143
A persuasive, although not governing, source on the matter of state
responsibility is the International Law Commission Articles on State
Responsibility (“ILC Articles”).144 Adopted in 2001, the Articles are an
influential instrument of the secondary rules of state responsibility and per the
general commentary accompanying them, do not “attempt to define the content
of the international obligations, the breach of which gives rise to
responsibility.”145
Article I of the ILC Articles provides “[e]very internationally wrongful act of
a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”146 Article II defines
“internationally wrongful act” as “conduct consisting of an action or omission:
[that is] (a) attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes
a breach of an international obligation.”147
1.

Defenses to State Responsibility

Defenses to state responsibility, can be invoked when a state admits to
wrongful conduct but contends they should not be responsible for it, or that there
should not be consequences for it. These defenses include: necessity, distress,
consent, and force majeure.148 The occurrence of any of these is considered a
circumstance that precludes wrongfulness, as does “two other categories of state
conduct[:] . . . countermeasures, and self-defense.”149
i.

Force Majeure

Article 23 of the ILC Articles provides that:
the wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to
force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an
unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it

143 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 47 (Sept. 25);
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 481.
144 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 481.
145 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 31 (2001).
146 Id. at 32.
147 Id. at 34.
148 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 502.
149 Id.
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materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the
obligation.150
The commentary on this provision notes the difference between force majeure
and distress or necessity is partly due to the fact that the conduct involved in
invoking force majeure is “involuntary, or at least involves no element of free
choice.”151
Force majeure and distress are discussed in the Rainbow Warrior case (New
Zealand v. France) as decided by the France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal
in 1990.152 In that case, French agents blew up a civilian vessel docked in New
Zealand.153 Two of the French agents involved were then transferred to an island
in French-Polynesia for three years, and were not allowed to leave unless given
permission by both the French and New Zealand governments. 154 Both agents,
at different times, were moved off the island without consent of the New Zealand
government—one for urgent medical treatment, and the other to see her father,
who was dying of cancer.155 In both cases, the French government argued
circumstances precluding wrongfulness existed and it had therefore not breached
its obligation.156 New Zealand disagreed.157 The tribunal ultimately found that
France had breached its obligations, and none of the applicable defenses were
sufficient to preclude the wrongfulness of their conduct.158 The tribunal in
Rainbow Warrior ruled in favor of New Zealand on this defense, explaining that
“a circumstance rendering performance more difficult or burdensome does not
constitute a case of force majeure.”159
(i) Force Majeure and COVID-19
States have imposed measures to protect the health and safety of their
populations and secure their economies during COVID-19 that could potentially
breach international law but for the force majeure exception.160 This exception
has provided states some protection from otherwise wrongful conduct during the

150 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 145, at 76.
151 Id.
152 Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), France-New Zealand Arb. Trib., 20 R.I.A.A. 217
(2006).
153 Id. at 223.
154 Id. at 224–25.
155 Id. at 241–42.
156 Id. at 229–30, 240–41.
157 Id. at 230, 241.
158 Id. at 265–66.
159 Id. at 253.
160 Riddhi Joshi, Force Majeure Under the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility:
Assessing its Viability Against COVID-19 Claims, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/24/force-majeure-under-ilc-draft-articlesstate-responsibility-assessing.
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ongoing global health crisis.161 However, COVID-19 doesn’t always satisfy the
elements of the defense of force majeure, “because force majeure is a matter of
contract, the language in the parties’ agreement determines when and to what
extent force majeure will excuse performance in that particular contract.”162
ii. Necessity
Article 25 of the ILC Articles provides that:
necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of that state unless the act (a) is the only way to safeguard
an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does
not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole.163
This provision further states that the doctrine may not be invoked if the
international obligation at issue excludes the possibility of invocation of the
doctrine, or if the state contributed in any way to the situation of necessity. 164
Necessity is discussed in the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) 1990
decision Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia).165 In that case, the
ICJ considered whether necessity was a successful defense to Hungary’s breach
of international obligation when it suspended and abandoned works it committed
to perform on a hydroelectric dam project pursuant to a treaty. 166 Hungary
claimed Czechoslovakia appropriated the Danube River water in constructing a
dam as their reason for stopping work, holding Hungary responsible for its
breach.167 The court ultimately decided that the elements of necessity were not
satisfied, determining that “the state of necessity can only be invoked under
certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied, and the
state concerned is not the sole judge of whether those conditions have been
met.”168 One of these conditions is “peril.” The court distinguishes material
damage from peril by explaining that peril implies a risk of some kind, and
Id.
David A. Shargel, Revisiting Force Majeure and Other Contractual Considerations
Amid COVID-19, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 6, 2020) https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/revisiting-force-majeure-and-other-contractual-considerations-amid-covid-19.
163 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 145, at 80.
164 Id.
165 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 48.
166 Id. ¶ 49.
167 Id. ¶ 107.
168 Id. ¶ 51.
161
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regarding the imminency of the peril, the “mere apprehension of a possible peril
could not suffice in that respect.”169
An important distinction between necessity and force majeure is that “the
former involves a deliberate act not to conform to the obligation whereas the
latter involves material impossibility to conform with the obligation or to realize
the conduct is contrary to the obligation.”170
iii. Distress
Article 24 of the ILC Articles provides that:
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the
act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress,
of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to
the author’s care.171
The comments to this provision provide that “Article 24 is limited to cases where
human life is at stake.”172 Exceptions include where “(a) the situation of distress
is due . . . to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) the act in question is
likely to create a comparable or greater peril.”173 Examples provided in the
commentary include vehicles entering another State’s territory due to weather
or technical failures.174
However, distress is not confined to such cases, as the comments to the
Articles explain, and as Rainbow Warrior illustrates.175 The tribunal in Rainbow
Warrior accepted France’s plea of “circumstances of distress in a case of
extreme urgency involving elementary humanitarian considerations affecting
the acting organs of the State,” despite ultimately rejecting the defense.176
iv. Consent
Article 20 of the ILC Articles states that “valid consent by a State to the
commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that

Id. ¶ 54.
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 511.
171 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 145, at 78.
172 Id. at 79.
173 Id. at 78.
174 Id.
175 Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), France-New Zealand Arb. Trib., 20 R.I.A.A. 215, 253
(2006).
176 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 145, at 79.
169
170
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act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the
limits of that consent.”177 Commentary accompanying the provision provides
that consent is common, and gives examples of consent such as “transit through
the airspace or internal waters of a state, the location of facilities on its territory,
or the conduct of official investigations or inquiries there.”178 Comment 3
opines that
Consent to the commission of otherwise wrongful conduct may be
given by a State in advance or even at the time it is occurring. By
contrast, cases of consent given after the conduct has occurred are a
form of waiver or acquiescence, leading to loss of the right to invoke
responsibility.179
v.

Countermeasures

When one state breaches an international obligation, “a state injured by . . .
[that] violation . . . is entitled to take certain self-help measures against the
offending state as a means of inducing that state’s compliance.” 180 However,
one must first accurately attribute conduct to a state before countermeasures are
appropriate.181 Additionally, Article 51 of the ILC Articles establishes a
proportionality requirement—”countermeasures must be commensurate with
the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally
wrongful act and the rights in question.”182
The above-mentioned factors must be considered in their totality in deciding
whether, or how to respond to cyberattacks.
C. Attribution of Conduct and the FSIA
In order for a foreign state to be subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts under
the FSIA, there must be attribution of conduct to that state. Conduct can be
attributed to a state when that conduct was either committed by an organ of the
state, or if the conduct was committed by a person acting “under the direction,
instigation or control of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.”183 The
Id. at 72.
Id.
179 Id. at 73.
180 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 515.
181 Id.
182 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 145, at 134.
183 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 481; see Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serbia &
Montenegro), Judgement, 2007 I.C.J. 119 at 43, ¶ 179 (Feb. 26) (“[T]he Court affirms that
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commentary to the ILC Articles also clarifies this point—”the general rule is that
the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its
organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction,
instigation, or control of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.”184
In sum, there is a two-step inquiry in determining whether conduct is
attributable to a state: (1) was the conduct perpetrated by an organ of the state?
If not, (2) was the conduct perpetrated by someone acting under state control or
direction? If the answer to either question is yes, then the conduct is attributable
to a state.185 In order to complete this inquiry, one must clarify what constitutes
an “organ of the state,” and what “control” entails.
1.

Organ

The ICJ in Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro restated a
customary rule of international law, reflected by the ILC Articles in Article 4,
“that the conduct of any State organ is to be considered an act of the State . . .
and therefore gives rise to the responsibility of the State if it constitutes a breach
of an international obligation of the State.”186
Article 4 of the ILC Articles states in pertinent part:
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds
in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an
organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in
accordance with the internal law of the State.187
The accompanying commentary states that
reference to a State organ . . . is intended in the most general sense .
. . It extends to organs of government of whatever kind or
classification, exercising whatever functions, and at whatever level
in the hierarchy . . . No distinction is made for this purpose between
legislative, executive, or judicial organs.188

the Contracting Parties are bound by the obligation under the Convention not to commit,
through their organs or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to them, genocide . .
..”).
184 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 145, at 38.
185 Id. at 72.
186 Bosn. & Herz. v. Serbia & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. 119 at 43, ¶ 385.
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note 145, at 40.
188 Id.
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Additionally, the ICJ in Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro
emphasized that “persons, groups of persons or entities may . . . be equated with
State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, provided that
in fact the persons, groups or entities act in ‘complete dependence’ on the State,
of which they are ultimately merely the instrument.”189
While there is no test within the FSIA to determine whether an entity is an
“organ,” some courts will consider certain factors.190 The Court in Hausler v.
JP Morgan, following the factors for consideration set forth by the Second
Circuit, set out such factors for consideration:
Factors relevant under balancing analysis used in determining
whether entity is “organ of a foreign state,” under definition of
“agency or instrumentality” set forth by Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), include (1) whether the foreign state created
the entity for a national purpose, (2) whether the foreign state
actively supervises the entity, (3) whether the foreign state requires
the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries, (4) whether
the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the foreign country,
and (5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.191
2.

Control

Article 8 of the ILC Articles states “the conduct of a person or group of
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”192 While “acting on the
instructions” of a state is generally clear and uncontroversial in meaning, the
phrase “under the direction or control” is more ambiguous, and has been
discussed by multiple tribunals, including the ICJ and the former International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).193 Each of these tribunals laid out
its own test for determining what “under the direction or control” means.
In the ICJ case, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, the court set out the “effective control” test.194 Here, the ICJ
determined that state responsibility could be attributed to the respondent if it

Bosn. & Herz. v. Serbia & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. 119 at 43, ¶ 392.
Hausler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp.2d 553, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
191 Id.
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“directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant state.”195 The court stated, “for this
conduct to give rise to legal responsibility . . . it would in principle have to be
proved that the State had effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”196
However, in Prosecutor v. Du[Ko Tadi] (“Tadić”), the ICTY rejected the
ICJ’s reasoning and established its own test — the “overall control” test.197 This
is a much broader test and doesn’t require proof “that each operation during
which acts were committed in breach of international law was carried out on [the
state’s] instructions, or under its effective control.”198 The ICJ in Bosnia &
Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro noted that “the ICTY presented the
‘overall control’ test as equally applicable under the law of State responsibility
for the purpose of [determining] . . . when a State is responsible for acts
committed by paramilitary units, or armed forces which are not among its
official organs.”199
In comparing the two tests, the ICJ’s effective control test is a harder standard
to satisfy, as it requires proving the state had both strategic and tactical control
over the actor.200 Conversely, the ICTY’s overall control test merely requires
proof of strategic control.201 For example, a state sending money and arms to
their rebels in another country would probably be liable under the ICJ’s overall
control test, but probably would not be held liable under the ICTY’s effective
control test.
In determining which approach to apply on two separate issues before the
court, the ICJ in Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro stated, “it
should first be observed that logic does not require the same test to be adopted
in resolving the two issues, which are very different in nature.”202 It also noted
that “the ‘overall control’ test has the major drawback of broadening the scope
of state responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law
of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own conduct.”203
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D. State Attribution: Cyber Attribution
Attributing conduct to a state with regard to the cyber domain is referred to
as cyber attribution—”the process of tracking, identifying and laying blame on
the perpetrator of a cyberattack or other hacking exploit.”204 Attributing conduct
to a state carrying out cyberattacks has the potential be incredibly complicated,
as “the underlying architecture of the internet offers numerous ways for attackers
to hide their tracks.”205 Internet protocol (“IP”) addresses are easy to spoof, and
attackers can “use techniques such as proxy servers, to bounce their IP addresses
around the world to confuse attempts at cyber attribution. Additionally,
jurisdictional limitations can hinder attribution in cross-border cybercrime
investigations.”206
Not only is attribution necessary for liability, but it is also vital in
understanding the rationale behind attacks, to taking preemptive measures, and
lawfully responding to attackers.207 Additionally, “[a]ttribution is a required precursor to the use of self-defense in response to a malicious cyberincident.”208
Unfortunately, anonymity is relatively easy to achieve, and is “inherent in
cyberspace because a criminal can either use a fake identity or steal someone
else’s identity to launch an attack.”209 Methods of achieving anonymity include
shoulder surfing i.e., looking over someone’s shoulder to get their sensitive
information, using fake email accounts, spoofing IP addresses, using a proxy, a
drive by download attack (where a “computer becomes infected with malicious
software simply by visiting a website”210), malware, or a cross-site scripting
attack (“an attacker can use XXS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting
user…[they] can even rewrite the content of the HTML page” 211).212
There are, however, “different, specialized techniques available for
performing cyber attribution . . . [i]nvestigators use analysis tools, scripts, and
programs to uncover critical information about attacks.”213 The legal challenge
204 Linda Rosencrance, Cyber Attribution, SEARCH SEC. (Oct. 2017), https://searchsecur
ity.techtarget.com/definition/cyber-attribution.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Jawwad A. Shamsi et al., Attribution in Cyberspace: Techniques and Legal
Implications, WILEY ONLINE LIBR. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://onlinelibrary.wiley
.com/doi/full/10.1002/sec.1485.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Brian Laing, Drive-By Downloads and How to Prevent Them, LAST LINE (Sept. 21,
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is figuring out “[w]hat level of certainty/attribution is required to respond to an
attack” and how to impose liability for the attack. 214
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. Homeland and Cyber Threat Act
The Homeland and Cyber Threat Act (“HACT”) is a bipartisan bill introduced
to the House of Representatives in August of 2019 by representatives Jack
Bergman (MI-1, R) and Andy Kim (NJ-3, D).215 If passed, the bill would amend
Title 28 of the U.S. Code section 1605 (FSIA) to “allow claims against foreign
states for unlawful computer intrusion.”216 The following proposed language
would be inserted after section 1605B:
Section 1605C. Computer intrusions by a foreign state
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise
covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against
a foreign state by a national of the United States for personal injury,
harm to reputation, or damage to or loss of property resulting from
any of the following activities, whether occurring in the United States
or a foreign state:
(1) Unauthorized access to or access exceeding authorization to a
computer located in the United States.
(2) Unauthorized access to confidential, electronic stored
information located in the United States.
(3) The transmission of a program, information, code, or command
to a computer located in the United States, which, as a result of such
conduct, causes damage without authorization.
(4) The use, dissemination, or disclosure, without consent, of any
information obtained by means of any activity described in paragraph
(1), (2), or (3).
(5) The provision of material support or resources for any activity
described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4), including by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign state.
(b) A P P L I C A T I O N .—This Act and the amendments made by this
Act shall apply to any action pending on or filed on or after the date
Shamsi et al., supra note 207.
Bergman’s Bipartisan HACT Act Gains Momentum as Foreign Cyberattacks Increase
in Wake of COVID Crisis, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. CONGRESSMAN JACK BERGMAN (June 18,
2020), https://bergman.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=695.
216 H.R. 4189, 116th Cong. (2019).
214
215

156

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

of the enactment of this Act.217
At introduction, the bill had 67 co-sponsors—35 Republicans and 32
Democrats—and was eventually passed in the House by a vote of 336-71.218
This bipartisan support illustrates the issue’s importance. HACT was
reintroduced in March of 2021, this time by Rep. Colin Allred (TX-32, D) and
was co-sponsored by forty-five representatives.219 This new wave of interest
comes in the wake of the “SolarWinds hack,” a “massive Russian cyber
espionage campaign . . . which . . . had compromised at least nine federal
agencies and 100 private companies.”220
Despite strong support, critics argue that opening up foreign countries to
liability in U.S. courts could undermine the American government’s ability to
resolve issues diplomatically.221 Additionally, because the bill could invite
“reciprocal actions against the United States in foreign courts,” some are
concerned about America’s own extensive extraterritorial cyber activity. 222 By
removing immunity from foreign state actors and governments, “[a]llowing US
nationals and companies to sue…could open the door for foreign governments
to do the same, filing lawsuits against US intelligence agencies. The US
government uses cyber operations as a means to collect intelligence.” 223
In addition to this, “attribution becomes a major issue . . . for example, in
Russia, it is understood that cyber threat actors are allowed to act freely within
the country as long as they do not attack Russian companies or citizens. To
demonstrate that this constitutes support from a state actor would be extremely
difficult.”224 While this may be true, it seems the benefits could outweigh the
costs — foreign state hacking is a very real threat, proven by the SolarWinds
incident, and the fact that foreign adversaries have previously targeted American
businesses and individuals, wreaking havoc through informational and political
Id.
Id.
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warfare to the tune of billions of dollars.225 In addition, “adding the ability for
US nationals to engage in lawsuits with foreign governments would make for a
volatile environment for cyberthreat actors, and may be enough of a deterrent to
force them to shift their focus elsewhere.”226
B. Overruling the Entire Tort Doctrine
Another potential solution to closing the current gap in the law regarding the
FSIA and cybercrime is overruling the entire tort doctrine. As previously
discussed, the entire tort doctrine was borne from judicial interpretation of the
non-commercial tort exception to the FSIA and determines that the exception
only applies to torts occurring entirely, “wholly,” within the United States.227
However, the doctrine of stare decisis may deem overruling the entire tort
doctrine an unattractive option.
1.

Stare Decisis

Stare decisis is a doctrine of precedent, and means “to stand by things
decided.”228 Courts give a certain level of deference to prior decisions and are
hesitant to either reverse, if it was their own court that made the decision, or
contradict, if it was a higher or different court making the decision, decisions
that have already been made.229 This level of deference is supported by multiple
policy considerations, including “fairness, stability, predictability and
efficiency. Adherence to precedent ensures that like cases will be treated alike,
and that similarly situated individuals are subject to the same legal consequences
. . . there will be no equal justice under law if a . . . rule is applied in the morning
but not the afternoon.”230
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court discussed stare decisis, as a
“foundation stone of the rule of law” and noted that “to reverse a decision, we
demand a ‘special justification’, over and above the belief that the precedent was
wrongly decided.”231 Without such justification, the Supreme Court will not
overrule its prior decisions.
Characteristics of adjudication which have been suggested as satisfying this
Reaboi, supra note 221.
Wallenhorst, supra note 223.
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burden are:
(1) reliance upon changed conditions which have undermined the
basis of the challenged precedent;
(2) reliance upon the difficulties of the Supreme Court and lower
courts in applying the challenged rule;
(3) reliance upon inconsistency between the challenged decision and
subsequent precedent;
(4) overruling of a decision which was “wrong” from the start;
(5) overruling of a decision which itself overruled precedent;
(6) reliance upon fundamental constitutional principles;
(7) careful examination of the challenged precedent; and
(8) overruling only after full argument and careful deliberation. 232
However, this theory has been critiqued as being overly broad, allowing almost
any decision to be attacked or defended on the above criteria. 233
Public perception of the Supreme Court is also a consideration with regard to
stare decisis, since the Court’s legitimacy “depends upon the public perception
that in each case the majority of the Court is speaking for the Constitution itself,
rather than simply for five or more lawyers in black robes.” 234 It is important
that the public sees the Court as fair, and its decisions as final as well as accurate,
not only because it is the highest Court in America, but because it would
undermine the credibility of the Court if it seemed as if its decisions were made
arbitrarily or in connection with who sits on the Court.
While there are good reasons for the existence and continued adherence to
stare decisis as a doctrine, there are compelling critiques of it, including that the
doctrine “occasionally permits erroneous decisions to continue influencing the
law and encumbers the legal system’s ability to quickly adapt to change.” 235
Having the Court reverse its interpretation of the non-commercial tort
exception such that it only applies to torts occurring wholly within the United
States would prove challenging in the face of stare decisis considerations.
However, it has been done through legislation — JASTA (section 1605B)
abrogated the entire tort doctrine, allowing for jurisdiction over claims regarding
terrorism, where the entire tort did not happen solely within the US.236
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C. Expansion of the FSIA’s Terrorism Exception
Some think that passing the HACT would be akin to passing the terrorism
exception (section 1605A), but in theory, it would be possible to amend that
section itself to include a provision on cyberterrorism.
1.

Cyberterrorism

There are many differing definitions of cyberterrorism, and the phrase is
widely used by the media today. Generally, “cyberterrorism refers to the use of
the Internet in order to perform violent actions that either threaten or result in
serious bodily harm or even loss of life.”237 Cyberterrorism seems to involve
the cybercrime category of “government”— encompassing attacks against the
government such as “hacking government, military websites or distributing
propaganda.”238 However, there is no clear consensus on the exact definition of
cyberterrorism, or even whether the world has yet experienced a cyberterrorism
event.239
Cyberterrorism is appealing to modern terrorists—it’s cheaper than traditional
methods of terrorism, it provides terrorists with a veil of anonymity, it can be
conducted remotely, the variety and quantity of targets is vast, and it has the
potential to affect more people than conventional methods.240 Could this make
the threat more real? More likely? As of now, “[n]either Al Qaeda nor any other
terrorist organization appears to have tried to stage a serious cyberattack. For
now, insiders or individual hackers are responsible for most attacks and
intrusions and the hackers’ motives are not political.”241 As such, it can be an
elusive term to attach punishment to.
The terrorism exception of the FSIA could be expanded to include
cyberterrorism, thereby closing at least part of the legal loophole currently
affording foreign-state cyber criminals’ immunity from prosecution in U.S.
courts. It is possible to add language from the HACT, modifying it to include
and define cyberterrorism, or to simply modify the terrorism provision as is, so
that the provision becomes broad enough to encompass most cybercrimes within
the definition of cyberterrorism.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As it stands, there is a legal loophole which permits state sponsored
cybercriminals to attack U.S. citizens in the United States, without facing
liability in U.S. courts. The FSIA currently provides immunity from liability to
foreign sovereigns who engage in such behavior, unless a plaintiff can show one
of several enumerated exceptions to the FSIA applies to their case. While
cybercrime can be considered a tort for purposes of the non-commercial tort
exception to the FSIA, this provision does not apply to cybercrimes that
originate outside the United States and do not occur ‘wholly’ within the country,
making it easy for cybercriminals, such as those involved in the SolarWinds
hack, to get away scot-free.242
There is an increasing and imminent need to close this gap in the law, and
several ways to do so, including by abrogating the entire tort doctrine, expanding
the terrorism exception to the FSIA, or through legislation currently before
Congress (HACT). The United States should, and must, act swiftly and
decisively to protect its citizens from this very real threat.
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